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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many thought, no doubt, that the horrors of the Second World War—the camps, the cruelty, 
the extermination, the Holocaust—could never happen again. And yet they have. In 
Cambodia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time—this decade even—has shown 
us that man’s capacity for evil knows no limits. Genocide—the destruction of an entire people 
on the basis of ethnic or national origins—is now a word of our times. It is also a heinous 
reality that calls for a historic response. 
-Kofi Annan
1
 
 
For centuries, women were regarded as the “spoils of war”. Rape and sexual violence against 
women were seen as inevitable consequences of armed conflict and their occurrence was not 
effectively regulated or prevented. However, the last few decades have witnessed huge 
advances in the field of gender rights and the protection of women in war. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) have successfully prosecuted sexual violence as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, methods of torture and forms of enslavement and persecution. The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) also recognises and prosecutes 
sexual violations. According to the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has 
jurisdiction over four categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression.
2
 These crimes are separate and distinct from one another 
because they each have different requisite elements for establishing guilt, different purposes 
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and different levels of social stigma.
3
 The Rome Statute explicitly acknowledges persecution 
based on gender as a crime against humanity, and it is the first international treaty to 
officially recognise crimes such as sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy and 
forced sterilization.
4
 In addition, the ICTR Akayesu judgment is a watershed case because it 
provided the first international tribunal definition of rape.  Moreover, the Akayesu judgment 
recognised that rape and sexual violence could be used as tools of genocide.
5
 Furthermore, 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone acknowledged that forced marriages constitute legally 
recognizable crimes against humanity in the AFRC Trial and the RUF Trial.
6
 These 
developments represent great progress in the effort to recognise and prosecute serious sexual 
violations perpetrated during conflict situations. Yet, many serious abuses remain outside the 
purview of or are not fully recognised in international and national law. Forced marriages are 
an example of a grave violation of  basic human rights that has only recently received legal 
recognition.  
 
It is crucial to separate forced marriages from arranged marriages, which are a part of many 
cultures.
7
 Forced marriages can take different forms. Generally, forced marriages occur in 
wartime and involve a woman or girl being abducted and declared the “wife” of her captor 
without her consent or her family’s consent. In these “marriages” the woman is normally 
subjected to rape, forced impregnation, sexual slavery and sexual violence.
8
  
 
Although forced marriages have recently been recognised as a crime against humanity, this 
Article contends that this recognition is limited and does not address the gravity of forced 
marriages. Instead, this Article mirrors and extends the Akayesu decision. The Trial Chamber 
in Akayesu held that rape and sexual violence could be used as tools of genocide.
9
 In a similar 
vein, this Article argues that forced marriages can also be a form of genocide. It is important 
that forced marriages are recognised as a form of genocide because genocide has different 
criminal elements than crimes against humanity and, moreover, genocide serves a different 
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purpose than crimes against humanity. The purpose of the crime of genocide is to protect 
particular groups from extermination or attempted extermination, whereas the purpose of 
crimes against humanity is to protect the civilian population from persecution.
10
 If forced 
marriages have been used as an instrument for the extermination of a group, then it is 
essential that they are correctly prosecuted and the true nature of the offence acknowledged. 
While forced marriages may not be used in every genocide campaign, it is crucial that the 
avenues for prosecution exist when they have been used as a method of extermination or 
attempted extermination. 
Part II of this Article sets out how forced marriages fulfil the requisite components of 
genocide, even though they are not expressly enumerated within the Genocide Convention. In 
order to demonstrate that forced marriages fulfil the necessary elements for genocide, the 
Article focuses predominantly on the practice of forced marriages during the Rwandan 
genocide. This is for illustrative purposes only and, once established, the principle can be 
extended to other geographical locations. With regards to Rwanda, it is important to note that 
sexual violence, such as forced marriages, was just one of the methods employed in the 
genocide. Yet, although it was only one of the methods used, it was particularly destructive 
and must be addressed. The practice has also occurred in several other countries, such as 
Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
11
 Moreover, it is likely to remain a feature of 
armed conflict unless necessary steps are taken. Part III of this Article addresses what is 
required to prevent forced marriages from occurring during future armed conflicts. It outlines 
crucial remedies and reforms. This involves legal, economic, social, political and cultural 
reforms. This Article seeks to draw attention to the largely unrecognised practice of forced 
marriages as an instrument of genocide and, thus, a ‘heinous reality that calls for a historic 
response’.12 
 
II. FORCED MARRIAGES AS A FORM OF GENOCIDE 
The killing, torture, mutilation, sexual abuse and degradation of fellow human beings with 
the intention of destroying those people, in whole or in part, has received widespread 
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condemnation from the international community. On December 9, 1948, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted the International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention).
13
 
Every related 
subsequent international treaty has adopted verbatim Article II of the Genocide Convention, 
which stipulates the conditions necessary for an act to qualify as a form of genocide.
14
 
 
Article 6 of the Rome Statute defines genocide as any of the following acts committed with 
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as 
such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
15
  
Consistent with this definition of genocide, there are three main criteria necessary for an act 
to qualify as a crime of genocide: the act must fit within one of the enumerated offences; the 
act must be directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and the act must be 
committed with the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. This Article illustrates that 
forced marriages fulfil each of those elements.  
 
A. ENUMERATED ACTS 
In order to constitute genocide, it is only necessary for the action to come within the 
parameters of one of the enumerated acts. The practice of forced marriage is capable of 
satisfying acts (b), (c) and (d): causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction and; imposing 
measures to prevent births. While enumerated acts (b), (c) and (d) are the focus of this 
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Article, forced marriages could potentially satisfy both (a) and (e), depending on the 
circumstances.   
1. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group  
Definition: 
The ICTR Trial Chamber defined ‘serious bodily and mental harm’ to include ‘acts of bodily 
or mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution.’16
 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber held that the harm inflicted does not necessarily have to be 
‘permanent and irremediable.’17
 
With regards to forced marriages, the “wife” is subjected to 
rape and to grave physical and psychological abuse.  
Rape 
In these “marriages”, the “wife” is the regular victim of rape. The testimonies of “wives” 
clearly indicate that these women are subjected to rape and sexual violation.
18
 
Indeed, they 
are often forced to bear the children of their rapist and live in the forced intimacy of married 
life.
19
 The “wives” are often threatened with death if they refuse to engage in sexual relations 
with their “husband” or if they attempt to escape.20 Furthermore, the women are coerced into 
these sexual acts through psychological control and fear. The women have been violently 
abused and have watched their families and communities be massacred and are placed in a 
state of prolonged fear.
21
 In addition, the women often believe that they have to submit to the 
                                                          
16 Prosecutor v Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 156 (Jan. 27, 2000). The Rome 
Statute’s Elements of Crime stipulate that ‘serious bodily and mental harm’ includes ‘acts of torture, rape, 
sexual violence or inhumane and degrading treatment.’ See Elements of Crimes ICC-ASP/1/3, Art 6(b) ¶ 1 n 3. 
17  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 502. 
18 See Prosecutor v Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T Judgment, at ¶ 70 (June 20, 2007); Shattered Lives: Sexual 
Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath, HUM. RTS. WATCH 27-32 (Sept. 24, 1996) 
[hereinafter Shattered lives]; Barbara Bedont Gender-Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
198-99 (Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas eds., 1999); see generally Special Rapporteur, Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slave-like Practices during Armed Conflicts, Comm’n 
on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21 (June 6, 2000); see generally “Breaking God’s Command”: 
The Destruction of Childhood by the Lord’s Resistance Army, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 17,1997), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/001/1997/en/e3d1420e-ea53-11dd-965c-
b55c1122d73f/afr590011997en.pdf . 
19 Brima, Case No. SCSL 04-16-A, Judgment, at ¶¶ 199-200; Sesay, Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, Judgment, at ¶ 
1413. 
20 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 1, 58; see generally Sesay, Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, Judgment, at ¶ 1412. 
21 Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Judgment, at ¶ 199.  
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sexual demands or else they will no longer be regarded as the “wife” of the rebel and will be 
subjected to further and potentially worse abuse by other rebels, such as gang rapes.
22
  
Rape is one of the worst forms of physical abuse because it ‘strikes at the very core of human 
dignity and physical integrity.’23 Rape causes both physical and psychological pain and 
suffering. The psychological suffering may be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions 
and can be particularly acute and long lasting.
24 However, rape does not only inflict serious 
physical and mental harm upon the individual victim; it also inflicts grave harm to the 
community.
25
 The Trial Chamber in Akayesu recognised rape and sexual violence ‘as 
instruments of genocide based primarily on the physical and psychological harm to the 
woman, and secondarily on the potential impact of this on the targeted community.’26  
Furthermore, the Chamber recognised that this practice took place in Rwanda and explicitly 
acknowledged that ‘sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, 
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the 
destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole.’27 
Sexual abuse may be directed towards women as a group because ‘to rape a woman is to 
humiliate her community.’28 The abuse acts as a means of communication between the males. 
It signals the totality of defeat, as the men were unable to protect “their” women.29 The 
Rwandan culture places huge value on the chastity of the women and places the men in the 
role of protector.
30
 Hence, rape and sexual violence are forms of humiliation in Rwandan 
culture. Indeed, rape is often considered to be a fate worse than death.
31
 Rape and sexual 
violence unite feelings of hatred, superiority, vengeance and pride
 
for the perpetrating 
                                                          
22 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 27-32. 
23 Prosecutor v Delalić , Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, at ¶ 495 (Nov. 16, 1998). Hazim Delalić was the 
commander of the Čelebići prison-camp. Id. He was convicted of wilful killings, torture, wilfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury, and inhumane treatment. Id. 
24 Kelly D Askin Prosecuting Wartime Rape And Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J INT’L L. 288, 323 (2003). 
25 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 731. 
26 Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International 
Criminal Law, 46 MCGill L. J. 217, 228 (2000).  
27  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 731. 
28 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Of Kali Born: Violence and the Law in Sri Lanka, in FREEDOM FROM 
VIOLENCE: WOMEN’S STRATEGIES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 49 (Margaret Schuler ed., 1992).  
29 Eileen Meier, Prosecuting Sexual Violence Crimes During War: New Possibilities for Progress, 10 INT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 83, 87 (2004). 
30 For an insight into the Rwandan culture and the female gender’s position in particular see Villia Jefremovas, 
Loose Women, Virtuous Wives, and Timid Virgins: Gender and the Control of Resources in Rwanda, 25 CAN. J. 
AFR. STUD. 378 (1991). For specific reference to chastity and the role of men as protectors refer to page 383.  
31 Askin, supra note 24, at 321. 
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community.
32
 Furthermore, rape is intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the 
victim community.
33
 The ICTR acknowledged this by stating that ‘sexual violence was a step 
in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, 
and of life itself’.34  
Thus, the rape and sexual abuse of the “wife” take on two dimensions. Firstly, the rape 
inflicts serious bodily and mental harm upon the woman as a primary victim.
35
 Secondly, the 
sexual violations destroy the community itself. In this way, the rape of women of a particular 
group, even under the guise of a “marriage”, is a tool to commit genocide.36  
Physical and Psychological Harm 
Although rape and sexual violence are critical instruments for inflicting ‘serious physical and 
mental harm’ in forced marriages, they are not the only means employed. The “husbands” 
exercise complete control and domination over their women, and often subject them to 
physical abuse.
37
 From the outset, women subjected to these “marriages” are placed in a 
confusing and precarious situation with grave physical and psychological consequences. The 
women are beaten, psychologically oppressed and forced to live in prolonged fear.
38
 While in 
many instances, their “husbands” will have saved their lives through these coerced marriages, 
these men are also responsible for inflicting physical, sexual and psychological brutality upon 
them and their respective communities. Furthermore, in many cases the men have murdered 
the woman’s family and members of their community or even forced these women to do so.39 
Moreover, the woman must endure the social stigma attached to women who have been raped 
in a patriarchal society. This is heightened in the case of forced marriages as the woman is 
seen as a “collaborator” with the enemy.40 Her own community may reject her, in the belief 
that she married their persecutor in order to save her own life, thus betraying them.
41
  
                                                          
32 Christine Chinkin, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 326, 328 
(1994). 
33  Id. at 328-329. 
34 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 732. 
35 Copelon, supra note 26, 228. 
36 Id. 
37 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 27. 
38 Monika Satya Kalra, Forced Marriages: Rwanda’s Secrets Revealed, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
197, 215 (2001). 
39 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 20; Kalra, supra note 38, at 202. 
40 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 3, 19 and 74; Kalra, supra note 38, at 203. 
41 Kalra, supra note 38, at 203. 
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Therefore, these women suffer the psychological ordeal of being raped, being subjected to 
sexual violence and physical abuse and living in a state of constant fear. In addition, they 
must live with the trauma of losing one’s family, being ostracised by one’s community and 
being in the midst of the massacre of one’s own people. Moreover, these women must endure 
all of the above while being forced to live in the intimate relationship of a marriage with the 
perpetrator of all these violations against her and her community.  
Thus, forced marriages subject the “wife” to grave physical and psychological harm and these 
injuries are inflicted upon them through a variety of means. Furthermore, the harm inflicted 
affects not only the individual but also her role in society and the community itself. In this 
regard, the practice fulfils the criteria of ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ and, moreover, is an 
effective and especially brutal instrument of genocide. 
2. Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Conditions of Life Calculated to Bring About Its 
Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part  
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu held that this enumerated act should be interpreted as 
prohibiting ‘methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the 
members of the group, but which ultimately, seek their physical destruction.’42 In addition, 
the Trial Chamber provided an illustrative list of potential actions for the deliberate physical 
destruction of a group. These included a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes 
and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirements.
43
  
Although forced marriages have not been previously recognised, the practice can fulfil this 
enumerated act. Firstly, forced marriages may be a method to prevent births within the 
communities that the perpetrators seek to eradicate. By preventing children from being born 
into a certain ethnic group, the perpetrators are ensuring the physical destruction of that 
group, at least in part. Secondly, the high value and esteem placed on virginity and chastity, 
especially in patriarchal societies such as Rwanda, creates a social stigma against the victim. 
This stigma often results in women being reluctant to seek help or to report the sexual abuse. 
In turn, ‘their guilt and silence enforce and perpetuate the genocide.’44 If women recount the 
violations to their family or community, they often encounter social backlash. It is reported 
that ‘husbands no longer want to touch their violated wives, families reject daughters who 
                                                          
42  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 505. 
43 Id. at ¶ 506. 
44 Arden B. Levy, International Prosecution of Rape in Warfare: Non-discriminatory Recognition and 
Enforcement, 4 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 255, 266 (Spring 1994). 
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have been victimized, and women themselves, horribly traumatized, recoil from sexual 
conduct.’45 These victims have even been denied treatment for venereal diseases, refused 
counselling or denied abortions.
46
 Thus, these women are often compelled into silence in 
order to evade social stigma, blame, shame and isolation. The physical and psychological 
injuries inflicted upon the women and the group combine with the women’s ostracism from 
their community to bring about the physical destruction of the entire group.  
Lastly, forced marriages bring about the physical destruction of the group through the 
transmission of fatal venereal diseases. The “wives” are often infected with sexual 
transmitted diseases, such as HIV.
47
 The transmission of HIV and other sexual diseases is 
another example of rape being used as a method of destruction, albeit a slow and painful 
one.
48
 The use of a disease is a very effective and gruesome form of genocide because it 
eradicates the procreators and perpetuates death for generations. In this way, the killing 
continues and endures.
49
 Reports indicate that AIDS was intentionally used in Rwanda as a 
means to murder Tutsis, especially Tutsi women, in a deliberate and agonising manner.
50
 
Indeed, the Rwandan president stated that the former Hutu government purposely released 
AIDS patients in order to form battalions of rapists.
51
 Some of these Rwandan “wives” were 
as young as 10 years old when they are repeatedly raped and infected.
52  
 
Thus, forced marriages bring about the physical destruction of a group through a variety of 
means. These include preventing births, physical and mental suffering, exclusion of “wives” 
from their community and perpetrating a slow death through the transmission of fatal 
diseases. While these methods will not immediately kill the members of the group, they 
ultimately seek to, and eventually will bring about the group’s physical destruction.  
 
                                                          
45 See Jasmira Kuzmanovic, Bosnian Woman's Wounds: Rape and a Child Fathered by Hate, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 8, 1993, at 2; Judy Mann, Report From the Front, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 15, 1993, at E3.  
46 Anna Quindlen, Is Rape of Bosnians a Sophisticated Form of Genocide?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Mar. 17, 1993, at A27.  
47 Kalra, supra note 38, at 210; Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 3. 
48 Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 350, 354 (2003).  
49 Peter Landesman, A Woman’s Work, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 15, 2002, at 89, 116.  
50 Id.; Nicole Itano, How Rwanda’s Genocide Lingers on for Women, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 
(Nov. 27, 2002) available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1127/p08s01-woaf.html.  
51 Russell-Brown, supra note 48, at 354. 
52 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human 
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, at ¶ 45, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN4/2002/83/Add.2 
(Feb. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur’s Report 2002]. 
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3. Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births Within the Group  
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu acknowledged that forced impregnation could be a measure 
intended to prevent births.
53
 Forced marriages often result in forced impregnation.
54
 Article 
7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute defines forced pregnancy as the ‘unlawful confinement of a 
woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any 
population or carrying out grave violations of international law.’55  
Forced marriages can fulfil this definition. The “wives” in these marriages are abducted and 
compelled to remain in the marriage for as long as the “husband” wants her, due to economic 
dependence, social stigma, fear, psychological oppression and duress as well as the threat of 
death or physical abuse.
56
 In this way, the liberty of the “wives” is restricted and, thus, they 
are unlawfully confined.
57
 In addition, the woman must be forcibly made pregnant. Rapes 
that do not result in pregnancy will not qualify.
58
 However, ‘forcibly’ is not synonymous with 
violence or physical abuse. Instead, ‘violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or 
abuse of power’ can suffice.59 As previously discussed, the “wives” are regularly raped and 
forced into sexual acts with their “husbands”. Finally, the individual “husband” must intend 
to affect the ethnic composition of the population.  
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu held that in patriarchal societies, where the ethnicity of the 
child is determined by the identity of the father, the forced impregnation of a woman of 
different ethnicity would constitute a tool of genocide by affecting the ethnic composition of 
the group.
60
 Although, this theory does not comply with logic or science, as the child will 
                                                          
53 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 507. The Trial Chamber proclaimed that the act could 
include ‘sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and 
prohibition of marriages’.  See also Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 21-32.  
54 See Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 21-32. However, as with all of the enumerated acts, it is the intention 
of the perpetrator that raises this crime to the level of genocide. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish between 
pregnancy as an ordinary consequence of rape and as a conscious policy to forcedly impregnate. Generally, the 
requisite intent can be inferred from the facts, such as mass and systematic rapes. However, individual intent 
would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Siobhan Fisher, Occupation of the Womb: Forced 
Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DUKE L. J. 91, 125, 107 (1996). 
55 Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(2)(f). 
56 See Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 30. Furthermore, the important period of confinement was held to be 
between conception and the time she can no longer terminate the birth. See Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced 
Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.  
625, 662-63 (2001). By virtue of being in a forced marriage, the woman is unable to terminate the pregnancy. 
Id. 
57 Jonathon M. H. Short, Sexual Violence as Genocide: The Developing Law of the International Criminal 
Tribunals and the International Criminal Court, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 503, 524 (2003). 
58 Boon, supra note 56, at 660. 
59 Id. at 660-61. 
60  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 507. 
11 
 
carry as much of the “wife’s” genes as the “husband’s” genes, this perception is believed by 
the perpetrator, the victim and the communities.
61
  Thus, it is as effective as if it were true.
62
 
Rwanda is a patriarchal society and the women targeted to be “wives” of the Hutu men were 
only Tutsi women. In these “marriages”, they were repeatedly raped and forced to bear the 
children of their Hutu “husbands”.63 In this way, forced marriages compelled the “wives” to 
bear children of the rebels’ ethnicity and prevented them from bearing a child of their own 
ethnicity. Hence, the “husband” succeeded in strengthening his own group and weakening 
that of the victim. 
In addition, rape and forced pregnancy may prevent births within a group due to the physical 
and psychological harm that they inflict upon the victim.
64
 Following this sexual violation, a 
woman that was once capable of reproducing may refuse or be unable to procreate. In this 
way, rape may prevent births.
65
 As previously discussed, the “wives” of forced marriages are 
often raped and forcibly impregnated. Thus, even if the “wife” escapes, she may be so 
psychologically or physically traumatised from the “marriage” that she cannot or will not 
procreate. Furthermore, she may also be ‘rejected or retreat from the males in [her] 
community, fracturing the family and splintering the social structure.’66 Moreover, the mere 
presence of the children of the rebels’ ethnicity can further a cultural genocide, as their 
presence can cause strife and resentment within the community and serve as a constant 
reminder of oppression.
67
 
 
Thus, forced marriage effectuates the prevention of birth within a group, and therefore 
genocide, through numerous avenues. The practice forces the “wife” to bear the child of the 
rebel’s ethnicity and not one of her own. Furthermore, the woman is often unable or 
prevented from bearing a child of her own ethnicity, and thus the genocide plan is perpetrated 
even after the forced marriage or forced pregnancy ends.  
 
                                                          
61 Short, supra note 57, at 512-13; For an account of the perceptions of Tutsi families to the children of rape see 
Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 81-82. 
62 Short, supra note 57, at 512-514. 
63 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 21-32. 
64 Boom describes how forced pregnancy can lead to physical and mental trauma. See Boom, supra note 56, at 
660; Short, supra note 57, at 523. 
65 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 508. 
66 Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years 
Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 494 (1998). 
67 Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethnic Responses 
to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 375 (1998). 
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B. TUTSI ETHNICITY 
The second main condition for an act to constitute genocide is that the act must be directed 
against a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. In order to define ‘a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group’, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu interpreted the travaux préparatoires 
of the Genocide Convention. The Chamber concluded that the Genocide Convention intended 
to protect permanent and stable groups whose membership is determined ‘automatically, by 
birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.’68 The perception of a distinct and 
separate Tutsi ethnicity is embedded in most official Rwandan documentation.
69 
At the time 
of the genocide, it was mandatory for every Rwandan to carry an identity card signifying his 
or her ethnicity; that is, whether one was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.
70
 Furthermore, the law 
reinforced the different ethnicity as the Rwandan Constitution and national laws in place at 
the time of the genocide referred to the different ethnic groups.
71
 In addition, customary law 
required that the child take the ethnic lineage of the father and not the mother.
72
 All these 
factors contributed to and reinforced the belief that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were distinct 
ethnic groups whose membership was automatically determined at birth. Indeed, all the 
witnesses at trial testified ‘spontaneously and without hesitation’ as to their ethnic identity.73 
Thus, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu recognised the Tutsi as a separate ethnic group from the 
Hutu.
74
 
 Therefore, although the distinct ethnicity was largely a product of choice and perception, as 
opposed to immutable characteristics,
75
 the Tribunal determined that the Tutsi were a ‘stable 
and permanent’ group due to the deeply embedded belief in Rwanda that such ethnic division 
existed. Furthermore, one’s membership within the ethnic group was automatically decided at 
birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.  
The condition that the act ‘must be directed against a national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group’ requires not only that the Tutsi be recognised as an ethnic group but also that the acts 
be directed against them. Thus, the act must be directed against one or several individuals, 
                                                          
68 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 511. 
69 Id. at ¶¶ 170-71; ¶ 516, ¶ 702. 
70  Id.  at ¶ 702. 
71  Id. at ¶ 170. 
72  Id. at ¶ 171. 
73  Id. at ¶ 702. 
74 Id. at  ¶ 516 
75  Russell-Brown, supra note 48, at 370. 
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because such individual or individuals are members of a particular group.
76
 The Tutsi in 
Rwanda were killed and persecuted not because of their individual identity but because of 
their membership in the Tutsi ethnic group. Women were targeted for forced marriages 
because they were women and because they were Tutsi.
77
 Sexual abuse was perpetrated 
solely against Tutsi women, and Hutu women were only ever attacked if they were married 
and carrying the child of a Tutsi man.
78
 Hence, it was their membership in the Tutsi ethnic 
group that was the basis for the grave sexual violations committed against them.  
 
C. INTENT 
The third condition of genocide is that the act must be committed with the intent to destroy 
the group in whole or in part.
79
 This requirement of dolus specialis, or special intent, is the 
crucial element that distinguishes genocide from other crimes, such as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. In addition, the prosecutor must prove two tiers of intent. First, the 
prosecutor must establish the intent to commit the underlying offence. Second, the prosecutor 
must establish the dolus specialis, that is, the underlying offence was perpetrated with the 
intent of destroying the targeted group in whole or in part.
80 
 
Generally, it is evident that the “husband” intended to commit the underlying offences in 
forced marriages; that is, to rape, sexually abuse and force women into these “marriages”. 
The mere performance of the violation and the strong coercive methods employed by the 
perpetrators are strong indicators that the requisite intention was present. However, it is more 
problematic to prove the dolus specialis requirement, as it is a mental factor which is difficult 
or even impossible to determine.
81
 Yet, in the absence of this specific intent, an act cannot be 
classed as genocide, regardless of its degree of atrocity or heinous nature.
82
 Hence, in order 
                                                          
76 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 521. 
77 Short, supra note 57, at 516. 
78  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 731, ¶ 121. 
79 In the case of forced marriages, it is very important to distinguish intent from motive. While the ‘husband’ 
may have forced individual Tutsi women into these ‘marriages’ for his own personal reasons, including sexual 
gratification, this does not mean that these personal reasons prevented the ‘husband’ from also acting with the 
intention that his actions would destroy the Tutsi people in whole or in part. 
80  Otto Triffterer, Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such, 14 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 399, 400 (2001). 
81 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 523. 
82 See Hirad Abtahi & Philippa Webb, 1 THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES, 1375 
(2008) (quoting the Brazilian delegate, Mr. Amado). 
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for forced marriages to be recognised as a tool of genocide, it is vital that the requisite intent 
of the “husband” to destroy the ethnic group in whole or in part is proven.  
 
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu defined dolus specialis as a ‘specific intention, required as a 
constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to 
produce the act charged.’83 Given the difficulty in proving the subjective intent of a person in 
the absence of an express confession, the Tribunal has held that intention can be inferred 
from certain presumptions of facts.
84
 Important indicators of genocidal intent for forced 
marriages include the performance of the act within the broader context of other violations 
perpetrated against the group, the widespread or systematic occurrence of the acts, the 
involvement of state or organisational policy and the exclusivity of the attack against the 
group.  
1. Manifest Pattern  
The Element of Crime for the Rome Statute stipulates that the act of genocide can take place 
in the context of a ‘manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group.’85 This 
concept entails placing the individual’s actions against the victim within the wider context of 
other culpable violations directed against other members of the targeted group, whether these 
acts were committed by the same offender or by others.
86
 Thus, to prove intent, it is sufficient 
if the individual acted with knowledge of the genocidal plan or pattern or with knowledge 
that the act could destroy the group.
87
 During the Rwandan genocide, men were massacred; 
women and girls were killed, raped, mutilated and sexually enslaved; and children were 
killed and forced to be child soldiers or to labour.
88
 Others were forced to flee their homes 
and their country in order to survive.
89
 It was within this broader strategy that the practice of 
forced marriages was used as yet another tool of genocide. The guise of a “marriage” allowed 
the perpetrator to subject the group’s women to prolonged physical and psychological 
                                                          
83  Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 498. 
84  Id. at ¶ 523.  
85 Int’l Crim. Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3, art 6. ‘Manifest pattern of similar conduct’ is an 
analogous concept to ‘constructive intent’. Id. 
86  Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: 
The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu Cases, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 517, 532 (1999); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-
T, Judgment, at ¶ 88. 
87  Valerie Oosterveld, The Context of Genocide, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF 
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 49 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001). 
88 For general information on the Rwandan genocide, see generally Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 12-15; 
Adam Jones, Case Study: Genocide in Rwanda, 1994 (1999-2002) GENDERCIDE WATCH available at 
http://www.gendercide.org/case_rwanda.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).   
89 For a detailed account see Shattered Lives, supra note 18. 
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suffering and effectively to tear apart the fabric of Tutsi society. This practice combined with 
the other methods of destruction to form a prevalent and stringent attempt to destroy the Tutsi 
group.  
2. Widespread or Systematic  
Another important indication of the intent to destroy the group is an extensive and organised 
attack against the group. While a ‘widespread or systematic’ attack is not a requisite 
condition for genocide,
90
 it may be an indication of the perpetrator’s intent. Thus, the 
‘widespread and systematic’ nature of an attack holds important evidentiary value.91  
Reports on the Rwandan genocide found that forced marriages were commonplace and 
estimated that thousands of women were forced into marriages.
92
 In this way, the practice can 
be described as ‘widespread’. Indeed, it is estimated that 8.2 per cent of women and girls 
were forced to marry their abductors.
93
 In addition, forced marriages were systematic in the 
sense that these acts were part of a wider plan, that is, the massacre of another group. It is 
well-documented that rape and the sexual acquisition of another group’s female population 
can be used as a weapon of war to generate mass fear, terror and the destruction of lives and 
societies.
94
 In addition, sexual violence serves to intimidate, degrade, humiliate, discriminate 
against, punish, control and destroy a person.
95 
In Rwanda, forced marriages and sexual 
violence against Tutsi women were systematically incorporated into the widespread attacks 
against the Tutsi group.
96
 Human Rights Watch emphasised that administrative, military, 
political, and civilian authorities at the national and local levels encouraged the systematic 
sexual abuse of women and children to further the goal of destruction of the Tutsi.
97
 
Furthermore, the impunity surrounding the practice denotes that these violations were a 
premeditated strategy to use women and girls as weapons of war and to instil fear.
98
 
                                                          
90  William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 39 (2d ed. 2004). 
91 Id.. 
92 See generally Shattered Lives, supra note 18, see generally Special Rapporteur’s Report 2002, supra note 
52; see generally Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Integration of 
the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective, ¶ 45, Comm’n on Hum. Rts. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/73 (Jan. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur’s Report 2001]; see generally Akayesu, Case 
No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment. 
93  Special Rapporteur’s Report 2001, supra note 92, at ¶ 44. 
94 See Askin, supra note 24, at 288, 297-98. 
95 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 687. 
96 Kelly D. Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1012 (2005). 
97 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 48.  
98  Id. at 41. 
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Moreover, the systematic and organised nature of the attacks against the Tutsi women is a 
further indication that these were not isolated or opportunistic acts, but intentional.  
Although it is the perpetrator’s intentions, and not the number of victims, which is necessary 
to constitute genocide, there can be a strong correlation between the number of victims, the 
level of organisation, and the conclusion that the perpetrator intended to destroy the group in 
whole or in part.
99
 Forced marriages were commonplace and there was a strong pattern in the 
regularity of their occurrence, which indicates that their commission was part of the overall 
policy of the rebel groups to demean and massacre another group. The widespread and 
systematic practice of forced marriages greatly aids the conclusion that the perpetrators must 
have intended that their acts destroy the group in whole or in part.  
3. State or Organisational Policy  
A ‘state or organisational policy’ is closely aligned to the ‘systematic’ occurrence of the acts. 
As with ‘widespread or systematic’, it is not part of the legal requirements of genocide to 
prove a state or organisational policy. However, such a policy provides strong evidence of the 
requisite intent to commit genocide. In addition, the knowledge and planning of high-ranking 
officials and leaders of a genocidal plan, in which sexual violence is integral, demonstrates 
that the widespread occurrence of these abuses was not solely opportunistic or an unfortunate 
incident of war, but was intentional. This proves the necessary genocidal intent for both the 
individual perpetrators and the leaders.
100
  
In Rwanda, forced marriages and other sexual violations were part of the overall state and 
organizational policy. The state can be directly linked to the sexual violation of women and 
girls. Government officials and the Rwandan Armed Forces actively participated in the 
commission of these violations.
101
 The Trial Chamber in Kambanda held that the government 
controlled the national policy and the police, and that high state officials participated in 
                                                          
99  Schabas, supra note 90, at 39. 
100 See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 346 (The Trial Chamber recognised that superior 
responsibility is a well-established norm of international customary and conventional law. The superior should 
be held responsible as long as he knew or ought to have know that the act was about to be or had been 
committed and failed to take the necessary and reasonable step to prevent or punish the perpetrator. This is a 
significant clause because it allows the leaders to be prosecuted for forced marriages even if the individual 
“husband” escapes the preview of the international community). 
101 See generally Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Akayesu was a bourgemestre of Taba); see 
generally Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment (May 15, 2003) (Semanza was the 
bourgemestre of Bicumbi); see generally Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 01-64-T, Judgment 
(summary) (June 17, 2004) (Gacumbitsi was the bourgemeste of Rusumo). See also Shattered Lives, supra note 
18, at 1, 20 (Role of the Rwandan Armed Forces). 
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meetings where the course of the massacre was actively followed.
102
 Furthermore, the State 
aided and encouraged the rebel groups in perpetrating these sexual violations. In Rwanda, the 
Interahamwe were civilian militia who partook in the genocide under the command of the 
army, and the government and the Interahamwe’s sexual violation of women was condoned 
and encouraged by authorities.
103
 Soldiers and the national police assisted the militia by 
ordering people to stay in their houses, establishing roadblocks, confining targeted people to 
places where they could be more easily attacked and shooting people who tried to escape.
104  
Moreover, as discussed, women are often used as weapons of war and are even regarded as 
the legitimate spoils of war.
105
 The leaders of these organisations actively encouraged and 
orchestrated the violation and degradation of women and girls. State and organisational 
propaganda portrayed Tutsi women as arrogant and calculating ‘seductress-spies bent on 
dominating and undermining the Hutu.’106  Sexual violence against Tutsi women was seen as 
a means of dehumanising and subjugating all Tutsi and, indeed,
107
 the leaders actively 
encouraged the genocide killers not to ‘spare women and children’.108 This gender-based hate 
propaganda against Tutsi women translated into the rape, sexual slavery and general abuse of 
Tutsi women and girls during the Rwandan Genocide.
109
 The newspaper, Kangura, published 
this type of propaganda, and powerful government and military patrons supported it.
110
 The 
anti-Tutsi radio station, RTLM, contained National Revolutionary Movement for 
Development Party supporters.
111
 Thus, these sexual violations were not simply isolated acts 
of individuals acting solely of their own accord, but violations orchestrated and encouraged 
by leaders and perpetrated by individuals. They were part of an overall policy.  
 
The policy element is also reflected through the manner in which these attacks were carried 
out. Civilian areas were targeted, the men were quickly killed, and the women and girls were 
forced into “marriages” and sexual slavery, and were raped. Due to the widespread 
                                                          
102 See generally Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment (Sept. 4, 1998). 
103 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 20, 24. Habyarimana and his extremist factions set up the Interahamwe to 
facilitate the “cleansing” of the Tutsi.  See Alexandra Miller, From the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda to the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include Rape, 108 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 349, 351 (2003). 
104  Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 48. 
105 For an overview of the prevalence of rape in armed conflicts see Chinkin, supra note 32, 326-28. 
106 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 18. 
107 Id. at 2. 
108 Id. at 41. 
109 Leslie L. Green, Gender Hate Propaganda and the Sexual Violence in the Rwandan Genocide: An 
Argument for Intersectionality in International Law, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 733, 753 (2002). 
110 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 17. 
111 See Green, supra note 109, at 743 (arguing MRND was a Hutu-led political party). 
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occurrence of these violations, it is difficult to believe that the leaders of these organisations 
were unaware of it. The prevalence and public nature of these acts indicate that individual 
soldiers or rebels did not anticipate disciplinary action. Thus, the complicity of the fellow 
rebels, leaders and the state is insinuated.
112
 Therefore, it is clear that the state not only 
condoned this type of violence, but also instigated and participated in them. 
 
The genocide provision in the Rome Statute states that the perpetrator must intend to destroy 
the group ‘in whole or in part’.113 The clause in ‘whole or in part’ is interpreted as signifying 
a quantitative dimension.
114
 As discussed, forced marriages and sexual violations were 
carried out in a widespread and systematic manner and hence comply with the clause. 
However, the phrase ‘in whole or in part’ could also be interpreted as meaning that genocide 
can occur if a ‘significant part’ of the group is destroyed. ‘Significant part’ can be understood 
as persons within the group who hold ‘special significance’.115 If women were regarded as a 
group that holds ‘special significance,’ then the crimes committed exclusively against them, 
such as forced marriages and sexual slavery, could be recognised as ‘genocide’ by 
themselves.
116
 Within Rwanda, women are seen as holding ‘special significance’. They are 
the mothers and wives and they represent the home. Their destruction through sexual 
violence reaches beyond the immediate victim and acts as a means to destroy the entire 
community. Hence, their special significance and the impact that their destruction through 
sexual violence has on themselves and the community should be fully acknowledged.  
 
Forced marriages and the sexual violation of Tutsi women were ‘not a mere side effect of the 
conflict, but rather an integral part of the genocidal campaign.’117 Therefore, it is difficult to 
believe that these crimes were committed without the knowledge and intent that these acts 
would destroy the Tutsi population.  
 
 
                                                          
112 Shattered Lives, supra note 18, at 20 states that these violations were committed with impunity. 
113 Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 6.. 
114 Schabas, supra note 90, at 39. However, as noted in this book, many academics have criticised such an 
interpretation as it brings the condition of ‘quantity of victims’ into the genocide definition.   
115  Id. 
116 See Levy, supra note 44, at 280-81 (Levy states that because women tend to be viewed as a subgroup of 
their communities, violence against women may not always be regarded as affecting an entire group. Thus, 
while mass rape may be evidence of the crime of genocide, an international tribunal may not determine that 
rape, in and of itself, constitutes the international crime of genocide). 
117 Green, supra note 109, at 734. 
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4. Targeted Based on Membership in a Group and not Individual Identity  
Finally, the genocidal intent of the perpetrators can be discerned from the fact that only 
members of a particular group are subject to the attack. In Jorgić, the German Federal Court 
of Justice held that the perpetrators of genocide do not persecute a person in their capacity as 
an individual but rather in their capacity as a member of the persecuted group.
118
 In Rwanda, 
the genocidal plan was systematically executed against the Tutsi population, and the Hutu 
were largely spared. A vast majority of the victims of forced marriages, rape, sexual slavery 
and other sexual violations were Tutsi women.
119
 Indeed, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu 
acknowledged that sexual abuse was ‘systematic and perpetrated against all Tutsi women and 
solely against them.’120 Generally, Hutu women, or Tutsi women who the rebels believed 
were Hutu, were spared these violations.
121
 Thus, Tutsi women were persecuted in their 
capacity as members of the Tutsi ethnic group and in their capacity as women. Since only 
Tutsi women were subjected to these abuses, it is clear that they were not random or isolated 
acts. Instead, these abuses were intentional and systematic.  
 
Individual intent needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, the organised 
policy, the widespread and systematic occurrence and the exclusive targeting of Tutsi women 
imply that forced marriages, at least for some perpetrators, were committed with the dolus 
specialis to destroy the Tutsi group in whole or in part.  
 
In accordance with the definition of genocide, forced marriages fall within at least one of the 
enumerated offences, were directed against the Tutsi based on their ethnicity and there is 
strong evidence that the practice was committed with the intent to destroy the group in whole 
or in part. Hence, forced marriages in Rwanda fulfil the conditions for genocide and 
constitute one of the most heinous crimes imaginable.  
 
 
                                                          
118 Prosecutor v. Jorgić, Federal Court of Justice, 1999 (Ger.) quoted in Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 66 (2d ed. 2008).  
119 Russell-Brown, supra note 48, at 362. 
120 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 731. 
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III. REMEDIES 
A. LEGAL REMEDIES 
In recent years there has been significant progress on the issue of gender crimes. The Rome 
Statute is the first international treaty to have a subcategory of crimes against humanity 
dedicated to gender violations. In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
recognised that rape could be used as a tool of genocide.
122
 Under current international 
criminal law, it is possible to prosecute forced marriages as a crime against humanity under a 
number of subcategories including rape, forced pregnancy and under other inhumane acts, as 
evidenced by a recent conviction in Sierra Leone.
123 The Special Court of Sierra Leone 
regarded forced marriages as crimes against humanity, which inflicted grave suffering and 
serious injury on the physical and mental health of the “wives”. Furthermore, the Court held 
that the perpetrators were aware of the gravity of their crimes.
124
 Yet, there has not been a full 
recognition of the destructive nature of forced marriages. Forced marriages can also be used 
as a tool for the extermination or attempted extermination of a group. As discussed in this 
Article, there exist strong grounds to argue that the practice of forced marriages could be 
prosecuted as genocide. In Rwanda alone, forced marriages comply with the three main 
criteria of genocide: these “marriages” fit within a number of the enumerated acts, the acts 
are directed against a protected group and, although intent has to be determined on a case-by-
case basis, there is evidence that a large number of the actors intended to destroy the targeted 
group in whole or in part through their actions.  
However, some have questioned whether sexual violence and practices like forced marriages
 
should be so prosecuted. Some scholars fear that an overemphasis on the genocide aspect 
may obscure sexual abuse that is not committed with a genocidal intent, and that such 
violations will become invisible.
125
 Furthermore, they fear that focusing on genocidal sexual 
abuse would objectify the offence and that the crime would be seen primarily as a violation of 
the group and not the individual.
126
 While these are valid concerns, they can be neutralised. 
Murder is recognised as a grave crime even if it is not committed with a genocidal intent. In a 
similar fashion, forced marriages and sexual abuse can be recognised as serious crimes, even 
                                                          
122 Rome Statute, supra note 2, at art. 7(1)(g); Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, at  ¶ 731. 
123 Sesay, Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, Judgment, at ¶  1297. 
124 Id. at 1296. 
125 See Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of War, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
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if committed without genocidal intent. Indeed, as previously noted, forced marriages, 
committed without proof of genocidal intent, have already been prosecuted as crimes against 
humanity.
127
 Furthermore, focusing on the connection between the individual victim’s gender 
and ethnicity instead of only the groups’ suffering presents a more realistic view of the 
victim’s suffering and vulnerability. Genocidal sexual violence is not just about a woman’s 
identity as a woman, but it is also about a woman’s identity as a member of a particular 
group; both characteristics are important.
128
 
Moreover, recognition of forced marriages as a form of genocide will greatly aid its 
prevention and prosecution. There is a strong stigma attached to the crime of genocide. Thus, 
if forced marriages are recognised as a potential weapon of genocide, then the nature of the 
act committed would be acknowledged and the need for international intervention would be 
highlighted. Indeed, if forced marriages were so labelled, there would be a state obligation 
under customary international law to intervene. This state duty to intervene does not 
generally extend to crimes against humanity.
129 Hence, individual states and the international 
community would be compelled, at least in theory, to prevent these horrific crimes. 
Furthermore, classifying forced marriages as a tool of genocide would have a deterrent effect 
on its use and practice if there is a fear of prosecution. In this regard, recognising forced 
marriages as tools of genocide will not only be a step in preventing and prosecuting these 
violations but it will also be a recognition of the multidimensional nature of these acts.  
Forced marriages encompass rape, forced impregnation, sexual slavery, and sexual violence 
and also coerces the women into an intimate “relationship” with their “husband”. Hence, 
forced marriages cause prolonged physical and psychological injuries.
130
 The women must 
endure these violations with no possibility of escape and no perceivable end to the abuse. 
This makes forced marriages uniquely heinous. Without international recognition and active 
prosecution, it is impossible to regulate, prosecute or prevent these atrocities. Since the 
international community has been reluctant to alter the defintion of genocide,
131
 it is 
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important that forced marriages are seen as being encompassed in the definition through the 
enumerated acts, if not expressly enumerated itself.  
However, although recognition of the offence is a crucial first step, it is only a first step. It is 
vital that adequate investigation and prosecution of forced marriages takes place. In the realm 
of investigation, this may require changes to interviewing methods, such as female 
interviewers and translators, so that the women feel more comfortable recounting the sexual 
violations inflicted upon them.
132
 Furthermore, it is vital that women are interviewed in the 
absence of their “husbands”, so that it is possible to ascertain if they freely consented to the 
marriage and if they want to remain with their husbands. If the woman does not want to stay 
with her “husband”, the need for adequate economic, social, political and cultural reforms 
becomes even more imperative. In the interim, it is vital that women’s shelters or alternative 
forms of accommodation are in place. In addition, these crimes must be prosecuted. 
Prosecution is a way to tell perpetrators, and possible perpetrators, that such acts are against 
the rules of humanity and will not be tolerated. Hence, prosecution may possibly deter such 
actions in the future. Prosecution also reinforces to the women that the blame and shame lies 
with the abuser, not her, and may even give the victim a sense of closure. Prosecution and 
recognition of these violations against women are essential in order for the atrocities that 
occurred in Rwanda to be overcome. In the words of Pope Paul VI ‘if you want peace, work 
for justice.’133 
 
B. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL REFORM 
To prevent the reoccurrence of sexual slavery and forced marriages, reform beyond the legal 
forum is needed. The vulnerability of women to sexual violations is based upon numerous 
interlinked facets. The perception of women as the “spoils” of war, their social status, their 
economic dependency, and their lack of involvement in political life all contribute to the 
vulnerability of women.
134
 While the law must play a vital role in the prevention and 
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recognition of gender crimes, such as forced marriages, it is not solely capable of eradicating 
sexual violence against women. Re-education is a crucial step in the process of reform. This 
requires awareness building and training in the military that rape and sexual violence is 
unacceptable and that it will be prosecuted and punished.
135
 The myth that women are the 
“spoils of war” and that sexual violence is inevitable must be shunned and respect for human 
dignity must be upheld. 
 
An issue of the utmost importance is that the international community and national 
governments tackle the social stigma that surrounds victims of forced marriage, rape and 
sexual slavery. In a patriarchal society, a woman’s role is to be a mother and wife. This 
stereotype places huge value on a woman’s virginity, chastity and  
“purity”. Hence, once a woman is raped and abused, she is seen as “stained” and unsuitable 
for her traditional role of marriage.
136
 In addition to the trauma of being sexually violated, the 
woman is made to feel guilty and believe that she has brought shame upon her family and 
community.
137 
Indeed, her family and the community may even blame her.
138
 In a large 
number of cases, the woman feels compelled to hide the abuse that has been inflicted upon 
her.
139
 This can add further devastation and isolation even after the abuse has ended. 
Awareness campaigns, information centres, support groups and medical centres are all 
needed to assist victims of sexual abuse, and assure them that the guilt lies with the rapist and 
not with them.
140
 
 
In addition, victims of sexual slavery and forced marriages are often seen as “collaborators” 
with the enemy.
141
 This belief is particularly strong with regards to “wives” of enemy 
combatants.
142 
Their own communities deem these women to be traitors that collaborated 
with their community’s persecutors in order to save their own lives.143 This attitude fails to 
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recognise that the women have no control over their situation and in fact are being subjected 
to sexual slavery under the guise of “marriage”. These misconceptions must be addressed and 
the strong coercive control of the “husbands” shown, so that the families and communities 
realise that these women are not collaborators but the victims of serious violations with 
prolonged physical, mental, emotional and psychological injuries. 
 
To dispel myths and to protect women in times of war, it is also necessary to address 
women’s social status. In countries such as Rwanda and Sierra Leone, women are often seen 
as second-class citizens.
144
 As a result, violations of women’s rights are not accorded the 
same significance as the breaches of men’s rights. Equality is essential to the protection of 
women. This equality needs to be achieved on political, social and economic levels and 
women need to be integrated into these areas of life. The presence of women in the military 
and the government should act as an assurance that women’s issue are addressed. In addition, 
respect for women and their rights should develop.
145 
Furthermore, the presence of women in 
vital decision-making roles will dramatically impede the creation and use of government 
policies and military objectives that target women for abuses, such as forced marriages.  
 
In line with equality, it is crucial that women are given economic opportunities in order to 
ensure that they are not confined to the vulnerable role of second-class citizens. Equality and 
economic viability will empower women. With regards to forced marriages, the question of 
economics is imperative. Many women and young girls feel they have no choice but to 
remain with their “husbands” because they have been rejected by their own communities and 
have nowhere else to go.
146
 Economically, they are completely dependent on their 
“husbands” and are hence compelled to stay.147  
 
Forced marriage is a complicated issue that encompasses many aspects including 
enslavement, rape, psychological and physical abuse and dependency. Just as the issue is 
complicated, so is the resolution. It is comprised of many different components including 
legal, social, economical, political and cultural reform. Some of the changes can be 
implemented immediately, such as legislative reform, whereas others will take time, 
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prolonged effort, and marked changes in attitudes and beliefs. However, to ensure equality, 
protection of fundamental human rights, and physical and mental integrity, all these legal, 
social, economical, political, and cultural reforms must be implemented. Sexual violence 
against women as an incident of war can be eradicated, but it will take concrete action and 
will. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the last decade, great progress has been made in the arena of gender crimes. Rape and 
sexual violence are no longer regarded as crimes committed against ‘family honour or rights’ 
or as an ‘attack on  [the woman’s] honour’.148 Instead, it is accepted that such violations are 
an attack upon the woman and inflict serious physical and psychological injury. The 
watershed case of Akayesu represents an impressive advancement. It represents the first 
instance an international criminal tribunal recognised rape as an instrument of genocide.
149
 
Furthermore, forced marriages have been successfully prosecuted as a crime against 
humanity.
150
 Yet, forced marriages can also be used as an effective tool of genocide. Full 
recognition and active prosecution of this practice is needed. Without this, it is impossible to 
prevent future abuses and to bring the perpetrators of past offences to justice. There is little 
doubt, in the face of deeply embedded social practices, attitudes and beliefs that it will take 
more than legislative reform to bring about change. However, this does not mean that the law 
does not have a crucial role to play. The first step towards such change, towards equality and 
towards the prevention of the victimization of women during armed conflict is recognition. 
Hence, the international community must fully confront the practice of forced marriages to 
advance the process of change.  
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